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1. INTRODUCTION

On October 2, 1993, the German Federal Constitutional
Court, or Bundesverfassungsgericht ("Court" or "BVerfG"),
held1 that representatives of the German government could
formally ratify the Treaty on European Union ("TEU" or
"Treaty")2 by depositing a signed TEU in Rome. This decision

* J.D. Candidate, 1995, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A.,
1992, University of Cincinnati. This Comment is dedicated to the memory
of my grandmother, Emma Altrogge.
' Case 2134/92, Brunner v. The European Union Treaty, 1 C.M.L.R. 57
(1994). In the European Union ("EU"), this case is frequently referred to
simply as the MaastrichtDecision. For purposes of this Comment, this case
will be referred to primarily as Brunner, and secondarily as Solange III in
the discussion infra section 5.2.2.
' The TEU is an agreement among the twelve Member States of the
European Economic Community ("EEC") to further the integration of Europe
by establishing an economic and political union. The key features of the
treaty are the establishment of a new European governmental institution
called the European Union, the eventual establishment of a common
European currency, and a new form of intergovernmental cooperation in
foreign policy, security policy, justice and domestic affairs. See Treaty on
European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (224) 1 in EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAW: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 104 (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 1993)
[hereinafter TEU].
The TEU is the latest step in the long process of European integration
that began almost 40-years ago in 1957 when the Treaty of Rome
established the EEC. The goal of the EEC was to establish a "common
market" throughout the Community by eliminating barriers to trade. This
common market aimed to increase economic efficiency by reducing
transaction costs, increasing competition, and spurring the development of
Europe-wide firms to take advantage of economies of scale. After significant
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enabled the TEU to go into force on November 1, 1993. The
Brunner decision, both because of its holding and its
underlying methodology, will greatly influence the future
development of the EU.
Although the ratification process did not present any
particular difficulties when the Treaty initially was signed by
the Member States in February 1992, the Treaty faced a long
and contentious ratification process in several countries.4 In
France, voters narrowly approved the Treaty in a popular
referendum, while in Denmark, it took two attempts before
voters finally approved the TEU.' Germany, traditionally one
of European integration's strongest supporters, however,
delayed ratification the longest.
Germany's two houses of Parliament approved the Treaty
ahead of schedule in December 1992. Several different
political groups, however, challenged the implementing
statute's constitutionality in the Federal Constitutional Court,
prompting the Federal President to postpone signing the
statute. The Court heard oral arguments in June 1993, and in
October 1993 held that Germany's ratification of the Treaty
was constitutional.
This Comment will examine the BVerfG's decision, its
importance for European integration, the applicable
constitutional issues and arguments, the Court's underlying
methodology, possible influences on the Court, and the effects
this decision could have on business within the EU. Section 2
demonstrates the importance of the treaty to European
integration. Section 3 discusses the constitutional issues

early success, the drive towards the common market stalled during the
economic crises in the 1970s. In 1987, the Member States completed the
Single European Act, which consisted of a series of measures designed to
complete a single internal market by i992. The TEU was designed to
expand on the success of the Single European Act by reducing the interest
rate risk inherent in separate currencies and ensuring the continued
existence of the EEC by deepening political interdependence. See generally
J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991)

(tracing the development of the relationship between the EEC and its
Member States through three distinct phases).
s ConstitutionalCourt Removes Last Obstacle to German Ratificationof
Maastricht Treaty on European Unity, WK. IN GERMANY, Oct. 15, 1993, at
1 [hereinafter ConstitutionalCourt].
4 See id.
See id.
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involving accession to the TEU. Section 4 examines how the
Court addressed these legal issues in the Brunner decision.
Section 5 offers a critical analysis of the BVerfG's holding in
Brunner. Specifically, Section 5 argues that the Court
embraced relatively weak arguments on issues critical to its
ultimate holding, and suggests that the BVerfG was
predisposed to allow Germany to ratify the TEU. Section 6
examines the favorable mechanistic effects and unfavorable
methodological effects this decision will have on business
within the EU.' This Comment concludes that although the
Brunner decision is positive for business and European
integration since it allows the TEU to proceed, the Court's "as
long as" methodology creates uncertainty about the future that
ultimately will limit the positive aspects of this decision.
2. THE MAASTRICHT TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION AND THE

RATIFICATION PROCESS IN GERMANY
The Maastricht 7 Treaty on European Union "marks a new
stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the
peoples of Europe ....."' The TEU's provisions create an
economic and political union of the twelve Member States of
the former EEC.'
2.1. Provisions of the Economic Union
The creation of the EU consists primarily of a three-step
process that results in a single currency, the European
Currency Unit ("ECU"), and a single European Central
The first stage of economic cooperation among
Bank.1"
I term the effects this decision will have on business as "mechanistic"
and "methodological." Mechanistic effects are those that develop solely from
the Court allowing the Treaty to be ratified; methodological effects are those
that relate specifically to the peculiar reasoning employed by the Court. See
discussion infra section 6.
' The TEU was formally signed by the Member States of the EU in
Maastricht, the Netherlands, on February 7, 1992 and is informally referred
to as the Maastricht Treaty. See TEU, supra note 2, at 104 (editor's note).
8TEU, supra note 2, tit. I, art. A.
9The TEU officially consolidated three individual communities, the EEC,
the European Coal and Steel Community, and the European Atomic
8

Community, into the EU. See Joachim Wolf, Die Revision des Grundgesetzes
durch Maastricht, 12 JURISTENZEITUNG 594, 595 (1993).
10 TEU, supra note 2, tit. VI.
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Member States has been completed and was supplanted by the
second stage on January 1, 1994.1' The second stage features
the creation of the European Monetary Institute ("EMI") to
coordinate the activities of the national central banks.1" In
addition, the national governments must meet a series of
"convergence criteria" involving the reduction of budget deficits
and the maintenance of a low inflation rate as conditions to
admittance into the third stage. 3
The newly-named
European Council, which is composed of the heads of
government of the Member States and the President of the
Commission, will determine whether a sufficient number of
Member States have satisfied these criteria to warrant
entering the third stage before 1999.1' The third stage would
replace the national currencies with the ECU and create a
reserve system with a single European Central Bank. 5
2.2. Provisions of the Political Union
The TEU also contains a number of provisions intended to
further the political integration of the Member States of the
new EU. One important element of this integration is the
expansion of Community-level involvement in foreign policy,
security policy, justice, and domestic affairs policy-areas
" The first stage of economic cooperation involved the coordination of
national monetary policies in a European Monetary System, with the goal
of keeping the national currencies within narrow ranges of fluctuation. See
id.
12 The EMI was established in Frankfurt, Germany. See FrankfurtBased EMI to Inherit Bundesbank Policies, Reuter European Business

Report, Oct. 29, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, REUEUB File.
13 See TEU, supra note 2, tit. VI, art. 109j. The criteria include, inter
alia, maintaining an inflation rate of no more than 1.5 percentage points
higher than the three best performing Member States, see Protocol on the
Convergence Criteria Referred to in Article 109j of the Treaty Establishing
the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, in EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW:

SELECTED DOCUMENTS 190 (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 1993)
[hereinafter Protocol on Convergence], and holding government debts to less
than a 60% ratio with gross domestic product, see Protocol on the Excessive
Deficit Procedure, Feb. 7, 1992, in EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: SELECTED

DOCUMENTS 189 (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter Protocol
on Deficit].
14 TEU, supra note 2, tit. VI, arts. 109, 109(0. The extent of discretion
the European Council enjoys regarding entrance into the third stage after
1999 is open to debate. See discussion infra section 5.2.
'r TEU, supra note 2, tit. VI, art. 109(1).
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previously left to the Member States-by the establishment of
a new form of inter-governmental cooperation.16
In addition, the TEU includes several institutional changes
that are likely to further political integration by strengthening
the EU's legitimacy vis-a-vis the Member States.17 One such
change is the new "co-decision procedure," which essentially
grants the European Parliament" the right to veto
legislation in certain areas, such as the free movement of
workers, the right of establishment, and education policy. 9
The TEU also codifies the "subsidiarity" principle, which
requires decisions to be made at the lowest level of
government.20
Finally, the TEU creates a "European
citizenship," which guarantees all Member State residents
equal participation in EU elections regardless of their
citizenship, and which also guarantees that a Member State's
consular protection to its citizens abroad is equally available
to all other Member States' nationals. 1
2.3. The Implementation Process in Germany
The first step toward ratification of the TEU in Germany
was an amendment to the Grundgesetz ("GG"), or the
Constitution, of Germany.22
Previously, GG Article 24
granted the constitutional authority to transfer state power to
the European Community ("EC"), allowing the "transfer [of]

16 See Wolf, supra note 9, at 596.
17 See generally Pierre Mathijsen, The Power of Co-Decision of the

EuropeanParliamentIntroduced by the MaastrichtTreaty, 8 TUL. EUR. &
CIV. L.F. 81 (1993) (examining the procedures involved in maintaining the
balance of powers among Member States and between the Member States
and the EU).
s The European Parliament is the only directly-elected institution of the
EU. See Wolf, supra note 9, at 598.
19 TEU, supra note 2, tit. XVII, art. 189b. The other legislative
procedures, the "consultation" and the "cooperation" procedures, at most
afford the European Parliament an advisory role in the legislative process.
See EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 80 (George A.
Bermann et al. eds., 1993).
20 See The Treaty - and What it Means, Press Association Newsfile, Nov.
1, 1993, available in LEXIS, News library, PANEWS File.
21 See id.
2 See Rupert Scholz, Grundgesetz und EuropdischeEinigung, 45 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2593, 2594 (1992).
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sovereign powers to intergovernmental institutions."2 3 There
was a growing awareness, however, that the EC, and
particularly the new EU, were no longer simply
intergovernmental institutions like the United Nations, but
had become supranational institutions outside the scope of
Article 24.24 Thus, the German Parliament amended the GG
by passing a new Article 23,25 which specifically permits the
Federal Republic to participate in the development of both a
united Europe and the EU by statutorily transferring some of
Parliament's sovereign powers to these institutions.2 6
Pursuant to the powers granted to it under the new Article
23, the German Parliament implemented the TEU by simple
statute,27 and further amended the other articles of the GG
to conform to the provisions of the TEU. For example,
Parliament amended Article 28, which involves voting
procedures, to grant to all Member State nationals residing in
Germany the right to participate in Community elections.2 8
Article 88 was also altered to allow the Bundesbank's (the
Federal Bank) duties to be transferred to the future European
Central Bank. "
23 GRUNDGESETZ, art. 24 (F.R.G.) (emphasis added).
24 See Scholz, supra note 22, at 2594.
25 Article 23 states in part:

The Federal Republic of Germany participates in the fulfillment
of a united Europe through the development of a European Union
that is obligated to respect democratic, legal, state, social, and
federal principles as well as the principle of subsidiarity, and to
secure basic rights protection essentially similar to those of this
Grundgesetz. The Federation may with approval of the Bundesrat
transfer sovereign rights through a statute.
GRUNDGESETZ, art. 23 (F.R.G.).
2 Article 23 also was amended to include provisions guaranteeing the
Bundesrat (the upper house of the German Parliament which is elected from
the Lander or state governments) the right to "participate in the
formulation of the political objectives and demands" pursued by the
government in areas transferred to the competence of the EU that had
formerly been the responsibility of the Lander. Id. These provisions were
intended to address any constitutional concerns involving the transfer of
powers of the Lander. See Scholz, supra note 22, at 2596. See generally
Peter Malanczuk, EuropeanAffairs and the "Linder"(States)of the Federal
Republic of Germany, 22 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 237 (1985).
27 Gezetz zum Vertrag vom 7. Februar 1992 iber die Europaische Union,
47 BUNDESGESETZBLATT II 1245, 1251 (1992).
28 GRUNDGESETZ, art. 28 (F.R.G.).
28 GRUNDGESETZ, art. 88 (F.R.G.).
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3. CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST ACCESSION To
THE TEU
The focus of arguments against German accession to the
TEU is GG Article 79, paragraph 3 which states:
"[a]mendments of this Basic Law affecting the division of the
Federation into Lander, the participation in principle of the
Lander in legislation, or the basic principles laid down in
Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible."30
Article 20
describes the Federal Republic as "a democratic and social
federal state."3 1 Thus, Germany's status as a democratic and
social federal state is a core principle of the GG. Those who
argue that Germany's accession to the TEU is unconstitutional
contend that the TEU violates this provision as well as the
other protected core principles of the German constitution.
3.1. The TEU and German Sovereignty
The principal argument regarding German sovereignty is
that this step in the integration process into the TEU is so farreaching that it materially threatens Germany's sovereignty,
and, therefore, its status as a democratic and social federal
state.3 2 The TEU creates an entity that is much more
powerful than the EC. This is evidenced by several key
characteristics of the EU: it will have a single currency, its
areas of competence will be expanded to include transportation
issues and social issues, as well as issues relating to security
policy and justice policy; its democratic institutions will be
strengthened by increasing the participation of the European
Parliament, and it will even have its own citizenship. 3 In
addition, unlike the EC, Article F, paragraph 3 of the TEU 4

30 GRUNDGESETZ, art. 79 (F.R.G.) (emphasis added). The architects of the
GG included this clause to prevent the recurrence of an event similar to that
in 1933 when Adolf Hitler used the enabling clause of the then-existing
Constitution to have dictatorial power "legally" transferred to him. See
Hans Heinrich Rupp, Muss das Volk uber den Vertrag von Maastricht
entscheiden?, 46 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 38, 39 (1993).
31

GRUNDGESETZ, art. 20 (F.R.G.).

See Dietrich Murswiek, Maastricht und Der Pouvoir Constituant, 32
DER STAAT 161, 174 (1993); Rupp, supra note 30, at 40; Wolf, supra note
9, at 598.
3 See ConstitutionalCourt, supra note 3, at 1.
3 Article
F, paragraph
3 states,
"[t]he2014
Union shall provide itself with the
Published
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arguably provides the EU with a competence-competence. 5
Thus, in many ways the EU resembles a sovereign state.
Some commentators argue that when a state transfers such
a great degree of sovereign power to another governmental
body so that the transferee governmental body begins to take
on the attributes of a fully-functioning state, the transferring
state at some point loses its status as a fully sovereign state.
One scholar termed this distinction the difference between a
"sovereign national state" and a "national member state."3 6
While commentators' views differ as to whether the EU simply
has "state-like characteristics,"" or has instead become a
supranational federal state, 38 they argue that with this step
in the integration process, Germany would relinquish so much
of its sovereign power that it would cease to be the sovereign
nation state guaranteed by Article 20."
3.2. The TEU and Democratic Principles
Another argument against accession to the TEU is that by
transferring so much power to the non-democratic EU, the
Treaty is disturbing the democratic principle at the core of the
German constitution.4 ° Of the three Community institutions,
only the weakest, the European Parliament, is an elected
body.4 The members of the European Council, the legislative
and policy-making body, are officials of the Member State
governments. Members of the Commission, the Community's
executive body, are bureaucrats appointed by the Member

means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its policies."
TEU, supra note 2, art. F, para. 3.
" A competence-competence refers to the unfettered power of the EU to
determine its own areas of activity. Such a power has arguably obliterated
the previous division of powers between the EC and the Member State
governments, under which the EC could only operate in certain delineated
areas. See Wolf, supra note 9, at 596.
s See Murswiek, supra note 32, at 168.
3 Rupp, supra note 30, at 40.
38 See Wolf, supra note 9, at 597.
s Murswiek, noting that it is impossible to measure a nation's power
with precision, suggests that Germany would be less than a sovereign state
if greater than 50% of its powers are transferred to the European
governmental institutions. See Murswiek, supra note 32, at 170.
40 See Rupp, supra note 30, at 40.
41 See Wolf, supra note 9, at 598.
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State governments.4 2
Some commentators point to the
expanding role of the European Parliament and the indirect
responsibility of the European Council ministers to the
Member State governments to support an argument that the
EU conforms to basic democratic principles.4 3
Other
commentators respond that this argument ignores the simple
fact that most activity at the Community level is undertaken
by the bureaucratic Commission.4 4 These observers argue
that the opportunity for only limited democratic participation
in the Community is not enough to satisfy the minimum
requirements of the democratic principles protected by the GG,
where democracy is described as flowing directly from the
people.4 5
3.3. The TEU and the Point of No Return
The final argument that the TEU would violate the core
principles of the Federal Republic's Constitution focuses on the
future effects that the TEU would have on Germany's
sovereignty and the democratic principles of the GG. The
thrust of this argument is that even if the constitutional core
is not disturbed at the moment Germany accedes to the TEU,
Germany will have irretrievably committed itself to a path
that will result in the disturbance of the constitutionallyprotected core.4 6
Commentators point to several provisions of the TEU as
examples of this danger. First, it is argued that even if Article
F, paragraph 3 does not presently give the EU a competencecompetence, the European Court of Justice could interpret it
to do SO. 4 1 Second, by committing itself to the monetary

42 See Paul D. Marquardt, Deficit Reduction: Democracy, Technocracy,
and Constitutionalismin the European Union, 4 DuKE J. COMP. & INTVL L.

265, 271 (1994).

" See Jirgen Schwarze, Das Staatsrechtin Europa,12 JURISTENZEITUNG
585, 588 (1993).
44 See Marquardt, supra note 42, at 271-72.
41 See Rupp, supra note 30, at 40; see also GRUNDGESETZ, art. 20 (F.R.G.)
("All state authority shall emanate from the people.").
46 See Murswiek, supra note 32, at 187.
The European Court of Justice traditionally has interpreted the
powers of the European institutions broadly. See, e.g., Case 14/68 Wilhelm
v. Bundeskartellamt,
1969 E.C.R.
1.
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union, Germany is, in effect, committing itself to relinquishing
control of all of its financial decision-making power, because
such control will ultimately prove to be necessary for the
successful operation of a monetary union.48 Finally, it is
argued, by agreeing to work towards "an ever closer union,"
Germany is acknowledging that it accepts a European federal
state as the ultimate goal of European integration.4 9
Some commentators contend that these provisions create a
process that essentially is irreversible. They argue that the
consequences of Germany leaving the EU would be so severe
that it is unrealistic to think that Germany could ever
withdraw from the Union."0 Thus, accession to the TEU
must be held unconstitutional now, because as one scholar
noted, "to wait is to wait until there is nothing left to
51
•decide."
3.4. Demands for a Referendum
Most commentators who argue that accession to the TEU
is unconstitutional instead propose that accession be voted on
by popular referendum,5 2 on the theory that, if accession
within the existing framework is not constitutionally possible,
a different form of legitimization must be utilized. According
to these commentators, it follows that since the people are the
ultimate source of legitimacy for the GG, they have the power
to amend any part of the GG through a referendum, including
those elements that form the constitutional core.5"
4. THE BVERFG's HOLDING IN BRUNNER
4.1. Standing
The first issue the BVerfG examined was whether the
complainants5 4 had standing to bring their actions before the
See Murswiek, supra note 32, at 186.
supra note 2, art. A.
0See Murswiek, supra note 32, at 175.

48

4, TEU,

61 Id. at 173.
52

See id. at 188; Rupp, supra note 30, at 39.

6 See Rupp, supra note 30, at 40.
"The Court entertained arguments from two complainants. The first
complainant was Manfred Brunner, who, as a top aide to a German
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol16/iss1/4
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Court.5 5 A complaint under GG Article 93, paragraph 1,
number 4a, is only justiciable where the complainant can
demonstrate that a constitutionally-protected individual right
is being currently and directly violated."6
In this case, the complainants brought their suits based on
everything from the GG Article 9(1) (in conjunction with 21(1))
right to form political parties to the quasi-fundamental right
to the maintenance of the separation of powers.5 7 The Court
systematically rejected almost all of these claims as

inadmissible, finding that either the asserted right was not a
individual right"
or the
constitutionally-protected
complainant had not shown the possibility of a violation of an
otherwise protected right.5
The BVerfG did find, however, that the first complainant
had made out a possible violation of his Article 38 right to
participate in the election of the Bundestag. 0 The Court
held that Article 38 guarantees individual citizens the
fundamental right to participate in the democratic process,
and thus gives individuals standing to challenge a law on the

Commissioner, had been fired for speaking out against the entrenched
bureaucracy in the EC. See Party Time for Brunner, FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct.
12, 1993, at 17. The second complainant consisted of a group-four
members of the Green party serving in the European Parliament. Their
main concern in this process was the protection of democracy. See David
Gow, Court Case Delays Bonn's Ratification of Maastricht,THE GUARDIAN,
Mar. 1, 1993, at 7.
"See Brunner, 1 C.M.L.R. at 57, 71.
" See id. at 76.
67 See id. at 72-73.

r"For example, the Court rejected all of the second complainant's
arguments because they involved only quasi-protected rights or non-existent
rights, such as the right to a popular referendum, that simply do not appear
in the GG. See id. at 83. The BVerfG also rejected arguments regarding the
sovereign status of Germany because it found there was no specific right to
this status. See id. at 85. The Court did address, however, the same
arguments in its holding under the mantra of the possible violation of the
democratic principle. See discussion infra section 4.2.2.
" For example, the court dismissed the first complainant's argument
involving his right to establish and participate in political parties because
the Court could not identify how the TEU would interfere with this right.
See id. at 82.
"0Article 38 of the GG states, "[a]nyone who has attained the age of
eighteen years shall be entitled to vote [for the Bundestag]; anyone who has
attained majority shall be eligible for election." GRUNDGESETZ, art. 38, para.
2. (F.R.G.).
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basis of a violation of the fundamental democratic principles
as described in Article 20 and protected by Article 79 of the
GG.61
4.2. Substantive Analysis of the TEU
The next issue for the Court was whether "there is a breach
of the democratic principle insofar as it is declared by Article
79(3), in conjunction with Article 20(1) and (2), to be
unassailable."62
4.2.1. Democracy Within the EuropeanInstitutions
The Court began with the proposition:
[The] democratic principle thus does not prevent the
Federal Republic of Germany from becoming a member
of a community of States (organised on a supra-national
basis). But it is a pre-condition for membership that a
legitimation and an influence proceeding from the
people is also secured inside the federation of States.63
The Court accepted the argument that within the institutional
structure of the EU, the only source of democratic legitimacy
is the popularly-elected European Parliament."
Furthermore, while the Court held that Parliament's future
role may be expanded to allow a sufficient amount of
democratic legitimization, the Parliament's present
"supporting role" is not enough to satisfy the minimum
requirements of the democratic principle.65

61 See Brunner, 1 C.M.L.R. at 76-77. The Court held that the complaint
under Article 38 was admissible only where it related to the implementing
law, not Article 23. The Court found that the complainant could not make
out a violation of his fundamental rights under Article 23 because it only
enables the implementation of laws that do not exceed the limit imposed by
Article 79. See id.
62
63

Id at 84.
Id at 86.

64 See id. at 86-87.

*6See id. at 87.
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4.2.2. Transfer of the Bundestag's Powers
Since the institutions of the EU do not independently
satisfy the democratic principle, the Bundestag remains the
principal method for the people to participate in the
democratic process.6 6 "Limits are then set by virtue of the
democratic principle to the extension of the European
Communities functions and powers," the Court emphasized,
"[therefore] functions and powers of substantial importance
must remain for the German Bundestag."' Thus, the Court
next examined whether the TEU exceeded this limit by
transferring too much of the Bundestag's sovereign power.
Ultimately, the BVerfG held that the Bundestag retained
sufficient control to satisfy the democratic principle protected
by Article 79. The Court strongly rejected the conception of
the EU as a state-like entity. 8
The Court's opinion
emphasized that the power of the EU was circumscribed such
that it was empowered to act only in certain limited areas. 9
The BVerfG also refused to consider that the new cooperative
structure provides additional competences for the EU because
these are not areas that had been transferred to the EU, but
rather are simply areas of new cooperation among national
governments.7 ° Finally, the Court found that the doctrines
of subsidiarity7 '
and proportionality 2
are further
guarantees of the limited nature of the EU.7 3
The Court also rejected the "point of no return" argument
by holding that the provisions of the TEU did not commit
Germany to any further transfers of control without its further
approval. 4 In finding that Germany was still one of the

66

67

See id. at 91.
I. at 88.

6' See id. at 91.
69 See id. at 96-97.
71 See id. at 93.
71 See supra section 2.2.
7' The doctrine of proportionality holds that any act by the EU must not
be overly intrusive as compared to the goals that the act is intended to
achieve. See, e.g., Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhrund Vorratsstelle fiur Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, 1140.
71 See Brunner, 1 C.M.L.R. at 104-05.
74 Germany's sovereign rights are equated with those of the Bundestag
because
of parliamentary
responsibility.
See id. at 103.
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"masters of the treaties," the Court focused its analysis on four
areas: 1) the ultimate goal of the treaty; 2) whether the EU
enjoyed competence-competence; 3) the inevitability of
complete economic union; and 4) whether the transition to the
third stage of the monetary union was automatic 7 5
First, the Court determined that the ultimate goal of the
EU was simply to create a stronger organization of states
rather than a federal state or a "United States of Europe." 6
Second, the Court held that "Article F(3) does not empower the
Union to provide itself by its own authority with the financial
means and other resources it considers necessary for the
fulfillment [sic] of its objectives."7
Instead, this clause was
intended as a "programmatic" or policy-setting sentence. 8 In
its analysis, the Court relied heavily on the argument that this
clause could not create such a power because the creation of
such a powerful entity was not the intention of the
signatories.7 9
Third, the BVerfG also rejected the argument that by
entering the monetary union, Germany was creating a factual
scenario whereby full economic union at the European level
would ultimately become irreversible.80
Whether full
economic union is the only way to complete a monetary union
successfully is a political question and should be decided by
the proper legislative bodies.8
The BVerfG held that if
Germany ever agreed to it, the Court would consider the
constitutional implications at that time.8 2
Finally, the BVerfG interpreted the TEU as "not subjecting
[Germany] to an 'automatic' progress to a monetary union,
which is unsupervisable and the momentum of which puts it
beyond control."8"
Instead, the BVerfG found that every
stage of the process towards monetary union was subject to
approval by the German government and, therefore, to

76 See id. at 90-103.
7

77

Id- at 90.
Id at 94.

id.
See id. at 94-95.
8o See id. at 102.
81 See id. at 103.
78
7

82 Id83

Id. at 101.
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parliamentary approval. 4 Furthermore, the Court held that
even after Germany entered the third step of the monetary
union, if the European Central Bank demonstrated that it
could not meet its policy guidelines on inflation, then
Germany's accession to the mechanism would no longer be
valid and Germany could leave the EU. 5
4.3. Scope of the Ruling
The Court stated clearly that as long as the Bundestag
provides the only viable instrument through which the people
can exercise democratic power,, then any further transfer of
Germany's sovereign powers would infringe upon the
democratic principle protected by Article 79.8" As the Court
noted, "[w]hat is decisive ... is that the democratic bases of
the Union will be built up with the integration process.""
Any expansion of the treaty-including expansion via judicial
interpretation-would not be binding on Germany because
such an expansion would not be sanctioned by the law
implementing the TEU and would be unconstitutional.8 " The
Court further made it clear that it would exercise its
jurisdiction to the fullest extent in order to supervise the
integration process. "

s4 See id.
86 See id. at 102.

See id. at 85.
Id. at 108.
8s Id,
89 Id
86

87
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5. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF BRUNNER

5.1. Point of No Return Argument
On two points that were related to the "point of no return"
argument and that were crucial to the Court's ultimate
holding, the BVerfG adopted arguments advanced by the
German government that were unsupported by the plain
language of the TEU or by accompanying sources and
statements. This section suggests that the Court may have
been predisposed to favor the German government's argument
on these issues, regardless of their merit.
5.1.1. Final Goal
The ultimate goal of a treaty and its signatories is
important in determining the precise objective to which a state
is committing itself." Thus, it would have been difficult for
the BVerfG to allow Germany to accede to the TEU if it had
ruled also that the Treaty's ultimate goal was the achievement
of a full federal state.
The Court relied primarily on
statements of political leaders in deciding that the TEU's
ultimate goal was not the establishment of a full federal
state.9 1 This reliance is misplaced because it is clear that
many of these leaders actually view a full federal state as the
ultimate goal of the TEU. For example, Chancellor Kohl often
is quoted as speaking of a future "United States of Europe.""
In fact, until the final draft of the TEU, when it was stricken
at the United Kingdom's insistence, the preamble specifically
committed the Member States to "a union with a federal
goal."9 3 Since the Court undoubtedly was privy to these
facts, it is difficult to understand its ruling on this issue.

90

Id. at 90.

' See Brunner, 1 C.M.L.R. at 90.
9" Helmut Kerscher, Die -Ehemit Europa, eine Frageder Souverinitit,
SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, July 2, 1993, at 3.
"' EC LeadersAgree at Maastricht Summit to Treaties on Monetary and
Political Union, FACTS ON FILE WORLD DIG., Dec. 12, 1991, available in

LEXIS, Europe Library, ALLEUR File.
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5.1.2. Transitionto the Third Stage
Another issue crucial to the BVerfG's holding that
Germany was not facing the "point of no return" was whether
Germany's entrance into the third and final step of the
monetary union was automatic. The Court's holding that
Germany has the right to approve the final transition to the
third step is not supported by the language of the TEU and is
contrary to Chancellor Kohl's public statements on the

subject. 4
The Court attempts to read a right of approval into the
Protocol9 5 accompanying the TEU that established the
specific convergence criteria for entrance into the third
stage."
Nothing in the Protocol's language supports this
conclusion. The Protocol does not mention the necessity of
further approval by a Member State parliament. Rather, it
details the economic steps required of the Member State.
That no further political steps at the national level are
necessary for entrance into the third stage also is supported by
the wording of Article 109j, paragraph 3, which states:
"[T]he Council... shall, acting by a qualified majority, not
later than 31 December 1996: decide ... whether a
majority of the Member States fulfil the necessary
conditions for the adoption of a single currency; [and]...
whether it is appropriate for the Community to enter the
third stage, and if so set the date for the beginning of the
third stage."97
Since this procedure does not require unanimous approval,
Germany's approval to enter the third stage is not even
required within the Council. It is difficult to argue, therefore,
that a separate parliamentary approval at the national level
is required.
The Court's argument is made even more suspect by the
wording of the Protocol on the Transition to the Third Stage of

" See Brunner, 1 C.M.L.R. at 103.
"Protocol on Convergence, supra note 13, at 190.
*"See Brunner, 1 C.M.L.R. at 100. Article 6 of the Protocol establishes
the convergence criteria for passage to monetary and economic union. See
Protocol on Convergence, supra note 13, at 191.
supra
note
2, tit. Repository,
VI, art. 109j
Published"byTEU,
Penn Law:
Legal
Scholarship
2014 (emphasis added).
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the Economic and Monetary Union.9" The Protocol labels the
movement to the third stage "irreversible."9 9 In addition, the
only possibility of a state not entering the third stage that is
suggested by the Protocol is where a state has not satisfied the
economic convergence criteria. 100 Finally, Chancellor Kohl
has repeatedly been quoted as saying that there will be no
"second ratification" for entrance into the third stage.'01
5.2. The Court's Motivation
The negative inference of the BVerfG's ruling is that if the
Court had held differently on issues such as the ultimate goal
of the TEU and the transition to the third stage, then the
BverfG would have been compelled to block German accession
to the Treaty. In light of the significant political pressures
attached to this issue and the Court's own precedent, it would
have been highly unlikely for the BVerfG to have ruled against
Germany's accession to the Treaty.
5.2.1. PoliticalPressures
The BVerfG, although structurally fully independent, has
shown itself to be "politically sensitive." In fact, two-thirds of
the judges that preside on the Court have a clear party
affiliation."0 2 The Court's political sensitivity is particularly
evident in cases involving foreign policy.'0 3 For example, in
a recent case involving the constitutionality of German
military participation in a United Nations mission in Bosnia,
the Court was roundly criticized for "being more concerned
about disappointing [Germany's] alliance partner than about

" Protocol on the Transition to the Third Stage of Economic and
Monetary Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (224) 1, reprinted in EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW SELECTED DOCUMENTS 191 (George A. Bermann et al. eds.,
1993) [hereinafter Protocol on the Transition].
" See id.
See id.
101 See Most Germans Oppose Abolition of Mark: Survey, Agence France
100

Presse, June 30, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, AFP File.
102

See Awqaiting the German Ja, THE ECONOMIST, May 22, 1993, at 57,

103

See Tom Heneghan, Speculation Mounts Over German Court View of

58.
Maastricht,Reuter European Community Report, May 24, 1993, available
in LEXIS, News library, REUEC File.
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the constitutional issues."'

Some commentators argue that

external pressure on the Court is not an issue for ratification

because public support for the TEU has diminished."0 5 The
TEU and European integration are the cornerstones of the
Kohl government's foreign policy, however, and a ruling
against accession to the TEU would have been "deeply
embarrassing.""°6
Thus, the serious consequences of
ratification, coupled with the Court's sensitivity to political
issues, are one reason why the BVerfG was apparently so
willing to accept weak arguments supporting Germany's
accession to the TEU.
5.2.2. Precedent
Brunner also can be explained by examining the BVerfG's
major precedent involving the EC. The two major BVerfG
cases involving the EC are Solange I and Solange 11.107 In
Solange I, the BVerfG held that as long as the EC failed to
strengthen the protection of fundamental rights through an
enumeration of protected rights comparable those protected by
the GG, then the BVerfG would review the constitutionality of
secondary community legislation. 08 Under the facts of that
particular case, the BVerfG held that the suspect legislation
did not violate the GG. 0'° In Solange II, the BVerfG held

104

See Marc Fisher, High Court Allows German Participationin U.N.

Balkan Mission, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 1993, at A19.
10" See Conor C. O'Brien, Next Door to Nietzsche's Children, THE
INDEPENDENT (London), July 2, 1993, at 24. Polls show that approximately
50% of the German public are in favor of the TEU. See Marcus Kabel,
German Court Approves Maastricht, Bonn Pleased, Reuter European
Community Report, Oct. 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library,
REUEC File.
106 See Heneghan, supra note 103.
107 See Wulf-Henning Roth, The Application of Community Law in West

Germany: 1980-1990, 28 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 137 (1991) (outlining the
application of EC law in the former West Germany); see also Internationale
Handelgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fflr Getreide und
Futtermittel (Solange I), 37 BVerfG 271 (1974); In Re Application of
Wflnsche Handelgesellschaft (Solange II), 73 BVerfGE 339 (1987). These
cases are known as Solange (meaning "as long as") I and I because of their
holdings. As the discussion in this section will show, the holding in Brunner
closely relates to these cases.
o See Solange I, 37 BVerfGE at 271.
o See id. at 288.
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that the EC had satisfied the demands the Court established
in Solange I, and that as long as the EC continued its
protection of fundamental rights, the BVerfG would not rule on
the constitutionality of secondary community law." °
The methodology in Brunneris very similar to the "as long
as" reasoning of Solange I and Solange II. In all three cases,
the BVerfG expressed a strong sentiment that in any conflict
of norms between Germany and the EU, German
constitutional concerns would prevail."' Nonetheless, in all
three cases, the Court also showed an unwillingness to hold
directly against the interests of the European-level entity. By
attaching the "as long as" conditions, however, the Court gave
itself the best of both worlds. It gave the German government
an important bargaining chip so that the Court's constitutional
concerns would be addressed without having to rule against
the EU directly. Thus, after Solange I, the EC became much
more active in protecting fundamental rights." 2 In the same
way, Brunner permitted Germany to ratify the TEU, while at
the same time giving the German government substantially
greater influence in future negotiations involving an expansion
of the European Parliament's role." 3 Thus, in many ways,
Brunner is really the third "as long as" decision, and thus can
be regarded as Solange III." 4

110 See Solange

II, 73 BVerfGE at 340.

. There is a distinction between the Solange I and Solange II cases and
the Brunner decision because the former cases involved secondary EC
legislation, and the latter addressed the constitutional challenge to a
German statute approving primary EU laws. The thrust of all three
holdings, however, is that ultimately, the BVerfG constitutional holdings
will have primacy over EU law.
12 See, e.g., Case 44/79, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 E.C.R.
3727.
113 In fact, during negotiations at Maastricht, Germany sought a stronger
European Parliament. See Tom Heneghan, German Court Strengthens
Bonn's EC Stand, Reuter European Community Report, Oct. 12, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, REUEC File.
114 See supra note 1.
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6. BRUNNER'S EFFECT ON BUSINESS
6.1. Mechanistic Effects
Brunner, or Solange III, will have significant effects for
business solely because it was decided favorably for the TEU.
Without question, the most significant aspect of the decision
for business was that it did not stop the TEU from going into
effect.
Had the ruling partially blocked ratification or
postponed it pending a referendum, the decision might well
have sounded the death knell for the TEU. In turn, the TEU's
anticipated benefits for business, such as a reduction in both
interest rate risk and transaction costs, would have been lost.
Another example of the mechanistic effect of the decision
is that, starting January 1, 1994, Member States began to
focus on the convergence criteria of the second stage of the
monetary union." 5
Europe is emerging slowly from a
serious recession;
EU unemployment rates have been
approximately 10.5%116 and national economies in the region
have only recently begun to expand after several years of
consistent contraction." 7 Many commentators argue that by
forcing the Member State governments to reduce inflation and
lower the public debt, the convergence criteria will help
continue to pull Europe out of its economic downturn."1
The Brunner decision may also help pull Europe out of its
recession by increasing consumer confidence in the EU. n 9
The long struggle to ratify the TEU, and the EU's efforts to
deal with the crisis in the Balkans, for example, have resulted
" See Bank of England Official Calls Single European Currency
"Inevitable," BNA International Business & Finance Daily, Nov. 5, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, BNAIBF File [hereinafter Bank of
England].
1 See Jeremy Lovell, EU Commission to Give Fight for Jobs a Legal
Basis, Reuter Newswire, Mar. 8, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Int-News
Database.
117 See Robert J. Sanudron, Saving the Welfare State from Itself, WASH.
POST, July 6, 1994, at 19.
118 See Bank of England,supra note 115. For example, Italy has already
abolished an account it used for day-to-day deficit financing. See Treasury
Account at Bank of Italy Abolished, Reuters, Nov. 11, 1993, available in
LEXIS, News Library, REUFIN File.
", See Presentation of Autumn 1993 Forecasts for 1993-95, Reuter
European Community Report, Nov. 10, 1993, available in LEXIS, News
Library,
REUEC
File.
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in a lack of confidence in the fate of the EU that has
translated into a general lack of consumer confidence.120
The positive outcome in Brunner has "lifted a psychological
weight from the community."121 This may in turn help
"generate a strong rebound in private sector confidence,
thereby entailing a faster-than-expected pick-up in domestic
demand in the Community." 22
Finally, the formal ratification of the TEU allowed the EU
to increase its competitiveness by focusing on the stalled
negotiations with Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Austria on
membership in the EU.
These negotiations had been
postponed during the ratification process. 23 On January 1,
1995, however, Sweden, Austria, and Finland joined the EU,
bringing the total number of Member States of the EU to
fifteen.124
6.2. Methodological Effects
Although Brunner should have several positive effects for
business by virtue of its holding, the specific "as long as"
methodology the Court employed likely will limit the actual
benefits that will accrue. By attaching the "as long as"
conditions to its holding, the BVerfG has created a good deal
of uncertainty about the future of the EU. The Court has put
itself in the position of supervising every step of the TEU and
any further European integration, thereby clouding the future
of the TEU by raising the possibility that at some point the
Court might seek to withdraw Germany from the EU.
The potential consequences resulting from a withdrawal by
Germany from the EU could be very serious. In the short
term, the EU could apply punitive tariffs to German products,
and Germany could even be excluded from the monetary

120

See id.

Oct. 30, 1993, at 1.
PresentationofAutumn 1993Forecastsfor 1993-1995, supra note 119.
.2 Klestil Hopes EC Summit Will Speed Austrian Entry, Reuter
European Business Report, Oct. 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, News
Library, REUEUB File.
124 See Patrick Smyth, Three More CountriesJoin the Biggest Economic
Club in the World, IRISH TIMEs, Jan. 2, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, MAJPAP File. Norway declined to join the EU after voters, in a
November 1994 referendum, rejected the proposal. Id.
121 In Briissel, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE,
122
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system. 12 5
In the long term, however, withdrawal by
Germany from the EU could induce the collapse of the EU.
Such a collapse obviously would have drastic consequences for
economic undertakings throughout Europe.
The threat of these consequences alone could have a
continuing adverse effect on consumer and investor confidence
in Germany and the EU. Although the uncertainty probably
will not deter the bulk of investment activities in Germany,
should the ECJ begin consideration of an issue that could be
seen by the BVerfG as an impermissible expansion of the EU's
powers, investors will have to consider in their decisionmaking
the outlying possibility of German withdrawal from the EU.
Particularly in marginal or long-term transactions, this
additional negative factor may prevent the consummation of
some transactions.
Thus, the BVerfG's methodology in
Brunner may prove to have economically inefficient results by
depriving society of the benefit of these transactions.
The solution to this problem is straightforward: either the
EU must accede to the BVerfG's dictates vis-a-vis the
strengthening of democratic institutions, or the Court must
issue another decision permitting accession to the EU without
an "as long as" condition. Until Germany implements one of
these solutions, the benefits of the anticipated economic
expansion from the ratification of the TEU will be limited due
to the uncertainty of Germany's future status within the EU.
7. CONCLUSION

The TEU is the most important step yet taken in the
process of European integration. It eventually will result in a
monetary union with a single currency for all Member States.
The TEU also will expand the areas of cooperation at the
European level and create institutional changes that will
result in greater political integration. The Brunner decision,
however, may have harmful implications for the goals of the
EU.
Germany must be a member of the EU for the Union to
succeed, but the transfer of so much power to another

12 There is no mechanism for leaving the EU. Membership in the EU
requires a unanimous vote by all Member States. See TEU, supra note 2,
tit. VII, art. 0.
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governmental body raises serious constitutional issues in
Germany. The German people's right to democratic control is
guaranteed through the Bundestag. Therefore, the Bundestag
must retain enough of its duties to satisfy the democratic
principles of the GG. Currently, however, the institutional
framework of the EU, particularly the limited role of the
European Parliament, does not provide for real democratic
legitimacy. Although many commentators feel the TEU thus
violates Germany's core democratic principle by transferring
too much power from the national to the supranational level,
the Court in Brunner held that it does not. While this element
of the Court's decision in Brunner is defensible, the Court's
holding that the TEU did not create a "point of no return" is
much more difficult to defend. In particular, the Court's
finding that the goal of the TEU is not a federal state, and its
holding that the transition to the third stage of monetary
union requires further parliamentary approval, are difficult to
support.
This Comment has argued that the Court was receptive to
arguments supporting the TEU because it was confronted with
a decision of significant political magnitude. In addition, the
Court's precedent in Solange I and Solange 11 made it likely
that, rather than rule directly against the EU, the Court would
issue a favorable ruling while at the same time attaching
conditions to ensure that the Court's lingering constitutional
concerns would be addressed. Thus, the German government
can now use this decision as a bargaining chip in any further
negotiations regarding European integration.
Finally, this Comment concludes that this decision is
positive for business because it did not create the disastrous
situation that would have arisen had ratification of the TEU
been denied or significantly delayed. Brunner may help
Europe pull out of its recession by forcing national
governments to adhere to the convergence criteria and by
increasing consumer confidence.
The Court's "as long as" methodology creates uncertainty
about Germany's status as a member of the European Union,
however, which ultimately may reduce consumer and investor
confidence in the EU, and possibly limit the benefits of the
This uncertainty can only be addressed by
TEU.
strengthening democracy in the EU's institutions or by a
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decision by the Court in favor of the TEU that does not
condition its approval upon the "as long as" language.
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